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BUT I’M AN AMERICAN!
A TEXT-BASED RATIONALE FOR DISMISSING
F-SQUARED SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS AFTER
MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
Alex Reed*
INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its muchanticipated decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.1 After
concluding that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does
not apply extraterritorially, the Court announced a new standard for
determining whether a particular securities transaction is subject to the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.2 Under this new
transactional test, Section 10(b) applies only to purchases and sales of
securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges and domestic transactions in other
securities.3
Although meant to be a bright-line rule, the transactional test has
generated considerable controversy on account of its ambiguity. Plaintiffs
have seized on this uncertainty to argue that securities fraud claims brought
by U.S. investors against foreign issuers remained viable post-Morrison
even when the relevant securities were purchased on foreign exchanges (“fsquared claims”).4 To date, courts confronted with this argument have
engaged in unnecessarily protracted analyses of the Supreme Court’s
rationale and policy objectives in announcing the test rather than focusing
on the text of the transactional test itself.
This Article concludes that the transactional test’s basis in the text of
the Exchange Act provides the simplest, most direct means for disposing of
f-squared claims. Part I provides a brief overview of the state of the law

* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of
Georgia.
1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. (Morrison III), 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
2. Id. at 2883–84.
3. Id. at 2884.
4. See infra text accompanying note 122.
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prior to Morrison. Part II traces Morrison’s rise through the district and
circuit courts up to the United States Supreme Court. Part III documents fsquared plaintiffs’ attempts to circumvent Morrison and analyzes lower
courts’ applications of the transactional test. Part IV proposes a text-based
rationale for dismissing f-squared claims that avoids the attenuated, policybased analyses employed by lower courts to date. Finally, Part V examines
the proposed standard’s applicability beyond the f-squared context.
I.

THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS TESTS

Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, the Second Circuit
employed two distinct tests to determine the extraterritorial reach of
Section 10(b). Satisfaction of either test was sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction, and courts sometimes merged the tests to obtain
jurisdiction over cases that could not satisfy either test independently.5
The first analysis was known as the “effects test” and was announced
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.6 Under the effects test, subject matter
jurisdiction was deemed to exist if “the wrongful conduct [abroad] had a
substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.”7
The second inquiry was known as the “conduct test” and was
announced in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.8
Under the conduct test, subject matter jurisdiction was deemed to exist if
investors located abroad were harmed by conduct emanating from the
United States.9 Significantly, the quantity and quality of wrongful conduct
necessary to confer jurisdiction varied depending on whether the injured
investors were Americans: “When the alleged damages consisted of losses
to American investors abroad, it was enough that acts ‘of material
importance’ performed in the United States ‘significantly contributed’ to
that result; whereas those acts must have ‘directly caused’ the result when
losses to foreigners abroad were at issue.”10
In recognition of the Second Circuit’s preeminence vis-à-vis
application of the federal securities laws, variations of the conduct and
effects tests were adopted by the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits.11 Although application of the effects test was relatively
5. Dennis R. Dumas, United States Antifraud Jurisdiction over Transnational
Securities Transactions: Merger of the Conduct and Effects Tests, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L.
721, 730–32 (1995).
6. 405 F.2d 200, 206–09 (2d Cir. 1968).
7. S.E.C. v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003).
8. 468 F.2d 1326, 1336–37 (2d Cir. 1972).
9. Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93.
10. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d
974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)).
11. Danielle Kantor, Note, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-Cubed Case:

REED_FINALIZED_FOUR (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

BUT I’M AN AMERICAN!

2/21/2012 7:29 PM

517

uniform across circuits, the degree of activity required to satisfy the
conduct test varied widely.12 For example, the D.C. Circuit required that
the conduct at issue constitute a prima facie violation of Section 10(b).13 In
contrast, the Third Circuit required only that there be some domestic
conduct in furtherance of the fraud.14 The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have taken approaches that fall somewhere between these two
extremes.15
Over the course of their forty-year reign, the conduct and effects tests
were subjected to extensive criticism. The chief complaint was that the
tests were unpredictable and inconsistently applied at both the intra-circuit
and inter-circuit levels.16 One commentator went so far as to suggest that
courts applying the tests “often seem[ed] to work backwards, first assuming
jurisdiction over a particular case and then shaping an analysis to support
the assertion of jurisdiction.”17 Consequently, a number of scholars
proposed that the conduct and effects tests be revised or eliminated
altogether in favor of a bright-line rule specifying the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. securities laws.18 After decades of inaction by Congress and the
United States Supreme Court, the fate of the conduct and effects tests was

Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 839, 866–68 (2010).
12. Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over
Transnational Securities Fraud, 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 152–53, 158–61 (1990) (discussing circuit
courts’ differing applications of the conduct test); David Michaels, Note, Subject Matter
Jurisdiction over Transnational Securities Fraud: A Suggested Roadmap to the New
Standard of Reasonableness, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 919, 926 (1986) (noting that the Second
Circuit, in applying the conduct test, sought to balance the quantity and quality of domestic
and foreign conduct, whereas other circuits “rel[ied] instead on the distinction between
significant and preparatory acts”).
13. James J. Finnerty, III, Note, The “Mother Court” and the Foreign Plaintiff: Does
Rule 10b-5 Reach Far Enough?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S287, S305 (1993).
14. Michael Wallace Gordon, United States Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction
in Securities Fraud Litigation, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 487, 521 (1996).
15. Kantor, supra note 11, at 867–68.
16. E.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 17 (2007);
Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities
Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2009); Paige Keenan Willison,
Note, Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders v. Banque Paribas London: Zero Steps
Forward and Two Steps Back, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 469, 472 (2000).
17. Matson, supra note 12, at 149.
18. E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 228–29 (1996); Erez Reuveni,
Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the
Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1071–72 (2010); Margaret V. Sachs, The
International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 682 (1990).
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finally decided on June 24, 2010 when the Supreme Court handed down its
opinion in Morrison.
II.

MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD.

A.

The Facts

National Australia Bank Ltd. (“National” or the “Bank”), a corporate
entity organized under the laws of Australia and headquartered in
Melbourne,19 was Australia’s largest bank.20 Its ordinary shares—the
equivalent of common stock in the United States—traded on the Australian
Securities Exchange and other foreign securities exchanges but not on any
U.S. exchange.21 National’s American Depositary Receipts,22 however,
were listed on the New York Stock Exchange.23
In 1998, National acquired HomeSide Lending Incorporated
(“HomeSide”),24 a Florida-based mortgage servicing company.25 Financial
institutions paid HomeSide a fee to collect and process their customers’
mortgage payments.26 The servicing rights associated with these mortgages
represented a future income stream to HomeSide, the present value of
which depended, in part, on the likelihood that the underlying loans would
be prepaid.27 Consequently, to calculate the present value of HomeSide’s
mortgage-servicing rights, company executives had to make certain
assumptions regarding the likelihood of prepayment.28 This value was

19. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig. (Morrison I), No. 03 Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 WL
3844465, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. An American Depositary Receipt (“ADR”) is a:
. . . receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents a specified amount
of a foreign security that has been deposited with a foreign branch or agent of
the depositary, known as the custodian. The holder of an ADR is not the title
owner of the underlying shares; the title owner of those shares is either the
depositary, the custodian, or their agent. ADRs are tradable in the same manner
as any other registered American security, may be listed on any of the major
exchanges in the United States or traded over the counter, and are subject to the
[federal securities laws]. This makes trading an ADR simpler and more secure
for American investors than trading in the underlying security in the foreign
market.
Id. at *1 n.3 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2002)).
23. Id. at *1.
24. Id.
25. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *1.
26. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2875–76.
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ultimately incorporated into National’s public financial statements.29
Initially, the acquisition appeared to be a boon for National. Between
1998 and 2001, the Bank consistently reported record profits.30 National
and three of the four individual defendants publicly attributed this success
to strong performance by HomeSide.31
On July 5, 2001, however, National announced that it would record a
$450 million write-down to reflect the decreased value of HomeSide’s
mortgage-servicing rights.32 In response, the price of National’s ordinary
shares and ADRs fell by more than 5%.33 Then, on September 3, 2001,
National announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion.34 Of that
amount, $400 million represented the devaluation of HomeSide’s
mortgage-servicing rights.35 Another $760 million was attributed to
mistaken assumptions in HomeSide’s valuation model. The remaining
$590 million represented loss of goodwill.36 As a result of the September
write-down, the price of National’s ordinary shares fell by almost 13%
while the price of its ADRs fell by more than 11%.37
On January 30, 2004, four individuals filed a consolidated class action
complaint against National, HomeSide, and certain individual defendants38
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.39
The complaint alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.40 Plaintiffs claimed that HomeSide
“knowingly used unreasonably optimistic . . . assumptions or
methodologies” in valuing its mortgage-servicing rights and that the
defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding
HomeSide’s “profitability, economic health, and its contribution to
[National].”41
Three of the four plaintiffs—Russell Owen and Brian and Geraldine

29. Id. at 2875.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2875–76.
33. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2.
34. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2.
38. The individual defendants included: (1) Frank Cicutto, National’s managing
director and chief executive officer; (2) Hugh Harris, HomeSide’s chief executive officer;
(3) Kevin Race, HomeSide’s chief operating officer; and (4) W. Blake Wilson, HomeSide’s
chief financial officer. Id. at *1.
39. Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 25, 2006) (No. 03-06537).
40. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *1.
41. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. (Morrison II), 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Silverlock (the “Australian Plaintiffs”)42—were Australian residents who
purchased National’s ordinary shares on the Australian Securities
Exchange.43 The Australian Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of foreign
purchasers of National’s ordinary shares.44 The fourth plaintiff, Robert
Morrison (the “Domestic Plaintiff”),45 was a United States resident who
purchased National’s ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange.46 Morrison
sought to represent a class of American purchasers of National’s ADRs.47
B.

The District Court Opinion

On March 11, 2004, the defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the
Australian Plaintiffs and for failure to state a claim with respect to the
Domestic Plaintiff.48 On October 25, 2006, Judge Barbara Jones granted
both motions.49
In ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, Judge Jones’ analysis focused on whether HomeSide’s
Florida-based activities were sufficient to satisfy the conduct test. The
Australian Plaintiffs argued that but-for HomeSide’s accounting
manipulation in Florida, National’s public statements would not have been
fraudulent, whereas the defendants asserted that “the alleged securities
fraud was committed—if at all—only when [National] distributed the
allegedly false information . . . abroad.”50
Although a “close call,” the court found that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the Australian Plaintiffs’ claims.51 Specifically, Judge
Jones held that the conduct test was not satisfied because HomeSide’s
activities in the United States were “at most, a link in the chain of an
alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad.”52
Before concluding, the court addressed the defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim vis-à-vis the Domestic Plaintiff. After
noting that economic loss is an essential element of a cognizable securities
42. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
43. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2.
44. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 169.
45. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2.
46. Id.
47. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 169.
48. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2, *8.
49. Judge Jones noted that the defendants did not include the Domestic Plaintiff’s
claims in their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since “[t]here is no
dispute that the securities law extends to protect domestic investors who purchase securities
in domestic markets.” Id. at *2 n.6.
50. Id. at *5.
51. Id. at *8.
52. Id.
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fraud claim, Judge Jones held that dismissal was warranted because the
Domestic Plaintiff had failed to allege any damages.53
C.

The Circuit Court Opinion

On February 13, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal
challenging the district court’s dismissal of the Australian Plaintiffs’ claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.54 Significantly, the Domestic
Plaintiff’s claims were not appealed.55 On October 23, 2008, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.56
At the outset of its opinion, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it
was being called upon “to revisit the vexing question of the extraterritorial
application of the securities laws.”57 After summarizing the relevant tests,
the court noted that the appellants were not relying on the effects test to
establish subject matter jurisdiction.58 Consequently, the court limited its
analysis to the conduct test, which required that the Second Circuit
“identify which action or actions constituted the fraud and directly caused
harm . . . and then determine if that act or those actions emanated from the
United States.”59
The Second Circuit ultimately found that subject matter jurisdiction
was lacking. The court held that “[t]he actions taken and the actions not
taken by [National] in Australia were . . . significantly more central to the
fraud and more directly responsible for the harm to investors than the
manipulation of the numbers in Florida.”60 The court concluded its opinion
by acknowledging: “When a statement or public filing [made by National]
fails to meet [applicable accounting, legal, and regulatory] standards, the
responsibility, as a practical matter, lies in Australia, not Florida.”61
Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the appellants’
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In light of the uncertainty associated with the conduct test, the
appellees invited the Second Circuit to adopt a bright-line rule regarding

53. Id. at *9.
54. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 169–70.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 177.
57. Id. at 168. After noting that the Exchange Act is silent with respect to its
extraterritorial application, the Second Circuit “urge[d] that this significant omission receive
the appropriate attention of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission.” Id. at
170 n.4.
58. Id. at 176.
59. Id. at 173.
60. Id. at 176.
61. Id.
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the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b).62 The appellees argued that no
amount of domestic conduct should be sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction if there was not some corresponding effect in the United
States.63 Because foreign-cubed cases, by definition, involve foreign
investors suing foreign issuers in connection with securities transactions
occurring on foreign exchanges, the relevant conduct in these cases does
not have any U.S.-related effects.64 Consequently, under the appellees’
proposed rule, foreign-cubed cases would be without the subject matter
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
The appellees asserted that such a rule would be consistent with the
presumption against extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory construction
providing that unless a contrary intent appears, U.S. laws are “meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”65 Failure
to adopt the appellees’ proposed rule would allegedly “undermine the
competitive and effective operation of American securities markets,
discourage cross-border economic activity, . . . cause duplicative
litigation[,]” and ensure international conflicts of law.66
The Second Circuit declined the appellees’ invitation, stating: “[W]e
are leery of rigid bright-line rules . . . .”67 With respect to the appellees’
conflicts of law concerns, the court declared:
The problem of conflict between our laws and those of a foreign
government is much less of a concern when the issue is the
enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the securities laws than
with such provisions as those requiring registration of persons or
securities. The reason is that while registration requirements may
widely vary, anti-fraud enforcement objectives are broadly
similar as governments and other regulators are generally in
agreement that fraud should be discouraged.68
The potential for conflict between Section 10(b) and the anti-fraud laws of
foreign nations, thus, did not warrant abandoning the conduct and effects
tests.69
Moreover, the Second Circuit was concerned that the appellees’
proposed rule would turn the United States into a “safe haven for securities
cheaters” who would then export securities fraud to the rest of the world.70
62. Id. at 174.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
66. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 174.
67. Id. at 175.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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The court conceded, however, that “we are an American court, not the
world’s court, and we cannot and should not expend our resources
resolving cases that do not affect Americans or involve fraud emanating
from America.”71 The conduct and effects tests were held to adequately
balance these competing concerns such that the court declined to adopt the
appellees’ proposed rule.72
D.

The Supreme Court Opinion

The question before the Supreme Court was “whether § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign
plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in
connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”73
The Court first addressed whether Section 10(b) applied
extraterritorially. Justice Scalia noted that prior to 1968 the district courts
in the Southern District of New York had consistently applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that Section 10(b) did not
reach fraud claims predicated on foreign stock transactions.74 Between
1968 and 1972, however, the Second Circuit “excised the presumption
against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of § 10(b) . . . .”75
Whereas the presumption against extraterritoriality provides that statutes
should not be given extraterritorial effect absent a clear mandate from
Congress, the Second Circuit had interpreted Congress’ silence regarding
the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) as an implied grant of authority to
discern whether Congress would have wanted Section 10(b) to apply to a
given fact pattern.76 To facilitate this analysis, the Second Circuit
developed the conduct and effects tests, which “became the north star of
the Second Circuit’s § 10(b) jurisprudence, pointing the way to what

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2875. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the
Southern District of New York erred in dismissing the petitioners’ claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at
2877. Instead, the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) was found to constitute a
merits question properly reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. Nevertheless, the petitioners’
request that the case be remanded to the Southern District of New York was denied on the
grounds that “a remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule
12(b)(1) conclusion.” Id. Consequently, the remainder of the Court’s opinion addressed
whether the petitioners’ allegations stated a claim under the federal securities laws.
74. Id. at 2878.
75. Id. at 2878–79.
76. Id. at 2879.
This analysis effectively turned the presumption against
extraterritoriality on its head, requiring that Congress expressly disavow any extraterritorial
application before the court would limit a statute’s reach to domestic matters.
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Congress would have wished.”77
The Supreme Court criticized the conduct and effects tests on a
number of grounds. First, the Second Circuit failed to identify “a textual or
even extratextual [sic] basis for [the] tests.”78 Instead, as early as 1975 the
Second Circuit conceded that, “‘if we were asked to point to language in
the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these [tests],
we would be unable to respond.’”79
Second, the tests were difficult to administer.80 The conduct test
varied depending on whether the harmed investors were Americans or
foreigners, and satisfying the conduct test was not necessarily sufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction since courts occasionally required that
there be “‘some additional factor tipping the scales’ in favor of the
application of American law.”81 Justice Scalia declared, “[t]here is no more
damning indictment of the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests than the Second
Circuit’s own declaration that ‘the presence or absence of any single factor
which was considered significant in other cases . . . is not necessarily
dispositive in future cases.’”82
Third, variations of the conduct and effects tests had been adopted by
the other circuits, resulting in an incoherent patchwork of tests for
determining the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).83
Citing these failings, the Supreme Court rejected the conduct and
effects tests in favor of a textual analysis of Section 10(b) as informed by
the presumption against extraterritoriality.84 After noting that “[o]n its face,
§ 10(b) contains nothing to suggest it applies abroad,” Justice Scalia
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Interbrew v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1998)).
82. Id. (quoting I.I.T. v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980)).
83. Id. at 2880. After quoting Justice Rehnquist’s oft-cited declaration that “[w]hen we
deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn,” Justice Scalia noted that:
. . . [t]he concurrence seemingly believes that the Courts of Appeals have
carefully trimmed and sculpted this “judicial oak” into a cohesive canopy, under
the watchful eye of Judge Henry Friendly, the “master arborist.” Even if one
thinks that the “conduct” and “effects” tests are numbered among Judge
Friendly’s many fine contributions to the law, his successors, though perhaps
under the impression that they nurture the same mighty oak, are in reality
tending each its own botanically distinct tree.
Id. at 2880 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
84. See id. at 2881 (“The criticisms seem to us justified. The results of judicialspeculation-made-law—divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the
situation before the court—demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.”).
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proceeded to consider and reject three text-based arguments for the
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).85 First, the petitioners cited the
Exchange Act’s definition of “interstate commerce,” a term used in Section
10(b), as evidence Congress intended to give the statute extraterritorial
effect.86 The Exchange Act defines “interstate commerce” to include
“trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any
foreign country and any State.”87 The Court dismissed this argument,
stating, “[W]e have repeatedly held that even statutes that contain broad
language in their definitions of ‘commerce’ that expressly refer to ‘foreign
commerce’ do not apply abroad.”88 Consequently, a single reference to
foreign commerce within a statutory definition was deemed insufficient to
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.89
Next, the petitioners pointed to Congress’ purpose in enacting the
Exchange Act as evidence that Section 10(b) was meant to apply abroad.90
The prologue to the Exchange Act provides that “prices established and
offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted
throughout the United States and foreign countries.”91 In rejecting this
argument, the Supreme Court observed that the antecedent of “such
transactions” was located “in the first sentence of the section, which
declares that ‘transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a
national public interest.’”92 The Court concluded, “[n]othing suggests that
this national public interest pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign
exchanges and markets.”93
The petitioners’ third and final text-based argument relied on Section
30(b) of the Exchange Act, which concerns persons “transact[ing] a
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States.”94 As
paraphrased by the Court, Section 30(b) provides:
“The provisions of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or
regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States,” unless he does so in violation of regulations
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission to

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2882 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(17) (2010)).
Id. (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 251) (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2010)).
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010)).
Id. (emphasis in original).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2010).
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prevent . . . evasion of [the Act].95
The respondents argued that Section 30(b) “create[d] only a narrow,
potential, SEC-gatekept extraterritorial application” of the Exchange Act
that was insufficient by itself to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality.96 In contrast, the United States Solicitor General argued
that Section 30(b) confirmed the Exchange Act’s extraterritorial effect
because the “exemption” embodied in Section 30(b) “would have no
function if the Act did not apply in the first instance to securities
transactions that occur abroad.”97 Although Justice Scalia found the
Solicitor General’s proposed interpretation “possible,” he held that
“possible interpretations of statutory language do not override the
presumption against extraterritoriality.”98
The petitioners’ reliance on Section 30(b) was further undercut by the
text of Section 30(a).99 In relevant part, Section 30(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to make use of
the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce for the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within
or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction
in any security the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized
under the laws of, or has its principal place of business in, a place
within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission may prescribe . . . .100
The Court found that Section “30(a) contains what § 10(b) lacks: a clear
statement of extraterritorial effect.”101 Justice Scalia reasoned that this
“explicit provision for a specific extraterritorial application would be quite
superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions
on foreign exchanges—and its limitation of that application to securities of
domestic issuers would be inoperative.”102 Consequently, the “clear
statement” found in Section 30(a) confirmed that Congress knew how to
give certain provisions of the Exchange Act extraterritorial effect such that
the absence of similar language from Section 10(b) reflected a deliberate
decision by Congress to limit its application to domestic securities

95. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2010)).
96. Brief for Respondents at 54–55, Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 081191).
97. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14,
Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191).
98. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253).
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2010)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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transactions.103
After concluding that Section 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially,
the Court addressed the petitioners’ argument that they were seeking only a
domestic application of the Exchange Act.104 Emphasizing the extent of
HomeSide’s Florida-based activities, the petitioners asserted that the
respondents’ conduct was sufficiently domestic to state a claim under
Section 10(b).105 Justice Scalia dismissed the petitioners’ argument,
reasoning that “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where
the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the
United States.”106 He went on to note that “Section 10(b) does not punish
deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered.’”107 Thus, even assuming that the conduct
constituting the alleged fraud occurred entirely within the United States, the
consolidated complaint failed to state a claim because the petitioners—all
of whom were Australian—purchased their shares on the Australian
Securities Exchange.108
The Court then announced a new “transactional test” for determining
the reach of Section 10(b).109 The opinion contains three articulations of
the test, each slightly different in its phrasing and terminology:
1. “And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”110
2. “[W]hether the purchase or sale is made in the United States,
or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange . . . .”111
3. “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange,
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United
States.”112
The Court asserted that its new test would avoid the international conflicts
of law concerns raised by Australia, the United Kingdom, and France.113

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 2883–86.
Id. at 2883–84.
Id. at 2884.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010)).
Id. at 2884–88.
Id. at 2886.
Id. at 2884.
Id. at 2886.
Id. at 2888.
Id. at 2885–86.
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Applying the transactional test to the facts of Morrison, the Court
held, “[t]his case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and
all aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners who still
have live claims occurred outside the United States.”114 Consequently, the
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the consolidated complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).115
III. F-SQUARED CASES POST-MORRISON
Although meant to be a bright-line rule, the transactional test has
proven difficult to administer for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court
failed to provide a single, coherent articulation of the test. Instead, the
opinion contains three variations of the test, each containing subtle yet
potentially significant differences. Second, the various articulations are
poorly drafted.116 The Court mistakes brevity for clarity, failing to define
certain key terms or otherwise specify the precise contours of the test.
Thus, rather than curing the uncertainty that plagued the conduct and
effects tests, the transactional test has cast what was previously a semistable area of the law into abject confusion.
A.

F-Squared Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Circumvent Morrison

Plaintiffs seeking to preserve f-squared claims argue that Morrison
should be limited to its facts so that only f-cubed cases are outside the
scope of Section 10(b). They contend that Morrison’s holding turned on
the fact that “all aspects of the purchases complained of . . . occurred
outside the United States” such that “the Supreme Court did not address—
and did not foreclose—the claims of U.S. investors who purchased
securities on a foreign exchange, where ‘aspects of the purchase’ occurred
in the United States.”117
114. Id. at 2888.
115. Id.
116. Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean:
Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8–14 (2011).
117. Supplemental Memorandum of Law Addressing Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd. and in Further Support of the Motion of the U.S. Members of the Institutional
Investor Group for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff at 2–3, Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 2010 WL 3377409 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-922) (quoting Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at
2888) (emphasis added); see also Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Concerning the
Impact of Morrison v. National Australia Bank at 5, In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec.
Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 02-5571) (“Unlike the facts of Morrison,
this is not a situation where ‘all aspects of the purchases . . . occurred outside the United
States.’”); Lead Plaintiffs Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board
and Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System’s Supplemental Memorandum of
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Plaintiffs ostensibly find support for their “some domestic aspects”
argument in the text of the transactional test. While conceding that
securities listed exclusively on foreign exchanges cannot satisfy the
“securities listed on domestic exchanges” prong of the test, f-squared
plaintiffs contend that transactions in such securities may nevertheless
qualify as “domestic transactions in other securities” so long as aspects of
the transactions occur in the United States.
By focusing on the purportedly domestic aspects of their purchases, fsquared plaintiffs seek to replace the Court’s bright-line rule with a factintensive inquiry reminiscent of the conduct and effects tests. Consider, for
example, the arguments put forth by the plaintiff—a U.S. institutional
investor—in the Swiss Reinsurance Company securities fraud class action
litigation.118 There, the plaintiff asserted that its purchases of Swiss Re
stock on the Swiss stock exchange constituted “domestic transactions”
within the meaning of the transactional test because the plaintiff “made the
decision to invest in Swiss Re stock, and initiated the purchase of Swiss Re
stock, from the United States.”119 In support of its contention, the Swiss Re
plaintiff cited the following facts:
As set forth in the accompanying affidavit of Tremaine Atkinson,
the Chief Operating Officer at LSV Asset Management (“LSV”),
the Chicago-based brokerage firm authorized to make trades on
behalf of [the plaintiff] during the Class Period, the decision to
purchase Swiss Re stock on behalf of [the plaintiff] was made by
LSV portfolio managers located in Chicago. Then, Chicagobased traders at LSV electronically placed orders for Swiss Re
stock on behalf of [the plaintiff]. Those purchase orders were
then executed by LSV traders located in Chicago, who
electronically routed the orders through electronic connections
Law Addressing the Impact of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. at 6, In re Royal
Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-300)
[hereinafter RBS Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law] (“Unlike the situation in Morrison where
the plaintiffs were ‘all Australians’ and ‘all aspects of the purchases took place outside the
United States,’ here the purchases occurred within the United States . . . .”); Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law in
Further Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 4,
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d
166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-1958) [hereinafter Swiss Reinsurance Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law] (“Morrison clearly contemplated circumstances where §10(b) was
implicated by the occurrence of only some ‘aspect’ of a securities transaction within the
U.S.”) (emphasis in original); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration of Dismissal of LAMPERS’ Claims or to Certify Dismissal at 3 n.2,
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-3758)
(“The analysis of ‘all aspects of the purchases’ does not make sense if only one ‘aspect,’
where the securities transaction was recorded, was controlling.”).
118. Swiss Reinsurance Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 117, at 2.
119. Id. at 7.
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that LSV maintains with a number of brokers who are
responsible for matching purchase orders for Swiss Re stock with
shares of Swiss Re stock that are offered for sale. In sum, Mr.
Atkinson averred that: (i) the decision to purchase Swiss Re
Stock [sic] was made by LSV portfolio managers in Chicago; (ii)
the orders for Swiss Re stock were placed from Chicago; and (iii)
the LSV traders who executed the purchase orders for Swiss Re
stock were located in Chicago.120
The Swiss Re plaintiff, thus, argued that the domestic aspects of its
purchases rendered them distinguishable from the wholly-foreign purchases
at issue in Morrison.121 Plaintiffs in other f-squared cases have advanced
similar arguments.122
F-squared defendants have had no choice but to respond in kind and
list every conceivable fact demonstrating the foreign nature of the
underlying securities transactions. Again, the Swiss Re case is illustrative.
After noting that the judge had “repeatedly urged Plaintiff to submit an
120. Id. at 7–8 (internal citations omitted).
121. See id. at 1–5.
122. See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(arguing plaintiffs “made an investment decision and initiated a purchase of [Credit Suisse]
stock from the U.S.” and “took the [Credit Suisse] stock into its own account in the U.S. and
incurred an economic risk in the U.S.”); Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment
Management Board’s Supplemental Memorandum Addressing Morrison v. National
Australia Bank and in Further Support of its Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and
Selection of Lead Counsel at 3–4, Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2010 WL 3377409
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-00922) (contending that the location “where the investment
decision is made” is dispositive of whether the transaction is foreign or domestic such that
plaintiff’s decision “to purchase its Toyota stock occurred within the U.S., as virtually all of
its money managers are U.S. based”); Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply Addressing the Impact of
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave
to Take Personal Jurisdiction Discovery at 5, In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., 2010 WL
3910286 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-02495) (arguing that one plaintiff “did not leave the
United States to purchase SocGen stock” but instead acquired the security “by means of
domestic contractual transactions, through U.S. investment managers”); Lead Plaintiffs’
Letter-Brief Responding to Show Cause Order as to Why the Federal Securities Claims of
Plaintiffs Who Purchased Alstom S.A. Securities that are Recorded on Exchanges Located
Outside the U.S. Should Not be Dismissed in Light of Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd. at 3, In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 03-6595)
(asserting that “[a]ll of the Lead Plaintiffs’ transactions were initiated in the U.S. and, as a
result, amount to ‘the purchase or sale’ of a security ‘in the United States’”); Lead Plaintiffs’
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to UBS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims Based
on Purchases of UBS Shares Outside the United States at 33–35, In re UBS AG Sec. Litig.
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 07-11225) (“Oregon’s purchase of UBS stock occurred in the
U.S. . . . because Oregon made the decision to invest in UBS stock, and initiated the
purchase of UBS stock, from the U.S. by means of domestic contractual transactions.”);
RBS Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 117, at 7 (asserting plaintiffs were
“prepared to demonstrate that their decisions to purchase many of their RBS ordinary shares
were made in the United States, based on the direction of their United States-based asset
managers”).
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affidavit setting out the full details of its stock transactions,” the defendants
suggested that the court had received only half of the picture.123
Specifically, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff’s affidavit was “silent
regarding what happened after LSV placed the orders—where the orders
were sent or where the trades were executed, cleared and settled.”124 In an
attempt to fill in the missing pieces, the defendants cited the following
facts:
In 2007 . . . Swiss Re common stock was listed only on the
SWX Swiss Exchange . . . and was traded only on virt-x[,] . . . a
subsidiary of SWX Swiss Exchange based in London. All
market transactions in Swiss Re common stock during the
purported class period were executed, cleared and settled on virtx’s trading platform in Europe.
Specifically, all clearing services for virt-x . . . were
performed by either LCH.Clearnet Ltd or SIS x-clear Ltd.
LCH.Clearnet Ltd maintains its registered office in London. SIS
x-clear Ltd. . . . is a Zurich based company and part of the SIS
Swiss Financial Services Group AG.
All settlement services for virt-x trades were performed by
Euroclear UK & Ireland Ltd, SIS SegaInterSettle AG or
Euroclear Bank. Euroclear UK & Ireland Ltd is incorporated in
England and Wales and maintains a registered office in London.
SIS SegaInterSettle AG is an Olten, Switzerland based company
and part of the SIS Swiss Financial Services Group AG.
Euroclear Bank is a limited liability company incorporated and
domiciled in Belgium.125
The defendants asserted that although the investment decisions and
purchase orders may have originated in Chicago, the trades were actually
executed, cleared, and settled in Europe such that they constituted foreign
transactions outside the scope of Section 10(b).126
The Swiss Re case, thus, illustrates precisely the sort of subjective,
fact-intensive inquiry the Supreme Court sought to avoid in announcing its
new transactional test.127 If lower courts were to hold that Section 10(b)
123. Supplemental Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 5, Plumbers’ Union Local No.
12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 0801958).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 5–6 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id. at 5–9.
127. See Credit Suisse, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (rejecting plaintiffs’ “some domestic
aspects” argument on the ground that “[t]he creation of such an exception to the Morrison
transactional rule necessarily would invite extensive analysis required to parse foreign
securities trades so as to assess quantitatively how many and which parts or events of the
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applies whenever the underlying securities transaction has “some domestic
aspects,” this sort of analysis would be required in virtually every f-squared
case.
B.

Lower Courts’ Application of the Transactional Test

As of the date of publication, no court had been persuaded by the
“some domestic aspects” interpretation of the transactional test. In
dismissing f-squared claims, however, district courts have ignored arguably
the simplest and most direct means for disposing of these cases.
Consider, for example, the case of Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group.128
Approximately two weeks after the Supreme Court handed down its
opinion in Morrison, the Credit Suisse defendants moved for judgment on
the pleadings with respect to those plaintiffs who purchased Credit Suisse
shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange.129 In granting the defendants’ motion,
Judge Victor Marrero relied on the Morrison Court’s rationale and policy
objectives rather than on the text of the transactional test.130
Judge Marrero predicated his dismissal of the plaintiffs’ f-squared
claims on three grounds.131
First, the “some domestic aspects”
interpretation of the transactional test improperly sought to revive the
conduct and effects tests. Second, under the plaintiffs’ theory, U.S. courts
“would be called upon to enforce American laws regulating transactions in
securities that are also governed by the laws of the foreign country and
exchanges where those securities were actually purchased or sold” in
contravention of Morrison.132 Third, the Supreme Court had signaled that
semi-domestic securities transactions would not satisfy the transactional
test.133
For Judge Marrero, the Morrison Court’s citation to Aramco134
provided additional evidence “that the presumption against extraterritorial
effect should not be diminished just because ‘some domestic activity is
involved in the case.’”135 In Aramco, the Supreme Court affirmed the
transactions occurred within United States territory, and then to apply value judgments to
determine whether the cluster of those activities sufficed to cross over the threshold of
enough domestic contacts to justify extraterritorial application of § 10(b)”); see also
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d
166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that “[t]he plaintiffs’ construction would require a factbound, case-by-case inquiry”).
128. 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
129. Id. at 621.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 624.
132. Id. at 625.
133. Id.
134. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 244.
135. Credit Suisse, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (quoting Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884).
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dismissal of a lawsuit brought by an American citizen against two of his
former employers, both Delaware corporations, for discriminatory conduct
that allegedly occurred while the plaintiff was working for the defendants
in Saudi Arabia.136 After concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
not apply extraterritorially, the Supreme Court held that dismissal was
warranted even though the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen and had been hired
by the defendants in Houston, Texas.137 Consequently, Judge Marrero
concluded that securities transactions may have some domestic aspects and
still be outside the scope of Section 10(b).138
Thus, rather than relying solely on the text of the transactional test to
hold that the defendants were entitled to judgment on the pleadings vis-àvis those plaintiffs who purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock
Exchange, Judge Marrero instead engaged in an unnecessarily protracted
analysis of the Morrison Court’s rationale and policy objectives.139
Several weeks later, Judge Marrero dismissed the claims of another fsquared plaintiff in an unrelated case, relying solely on his opinion in
Credit Suisse.140 Other judges have similarly relied on Credit Suisse to
dismiss f-squared plaintiffs’ claims—often without articulating any
independent rationale of their own.141
Swiss Re is another example of an f-squared case in which the court
failed to identify the most direct, text-based rationale for dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims. Judge Koeltl of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York phrased the issue as follows: “Whether a

136. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247.
137. Id.
138. Credit Suisse, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 626. In a footnote, Judge Marrero asserted that
Justice Stevens’ concurrence provided additional evidence that f-squared claims are outside
the scope of Section 10(b) post-Morrison. Specifically, Justice Stevens indicated that the
transactional test would not be satisfied under the following fact pattern: “[A]n American
investor . . . buys shares in a company listed only on an overseas exchange” and “[t]hat
company has a major American subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it
was in New York City that the executives masterminded and implemented a massive
deception which artificially inflated the stock price . . . .” Id. at 627 (quoting Morrison III,
130 S. Ct. at 2895).
139. Id. at 625–27; see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d
512, 532–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (relying on Aramco and Justice Stevens’ concurrence in
Morrison to dismiss f-squared claims).
140. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In
[Credit Suisse], this Court rejected Plaintiffs’ first contention [—that a U.S. investor’s
purchase of foreign securities on a foreign exchange constitutes a domestic transaction
under Morrison because the purchase was initiated in the United States—] as a general
matter.”).
141. See In re Royal Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting the transactional test and citing Judge Marrero’s holding in Credit
Suisse); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting the
transactional test and citing Judge Marrero’s holding in Credit Suisse).
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security that is not traded on a domestic stock exchange is ‘purchase[d] . . .
in the United States’ for the purposes of section 10(b) any time an investor
decides to purchase the security and places a purchase order with a broker
while in the United States.”142 After noting that the Supreme Court “did
not have occasion to discuss what it means for a purchase or sale to be
‘made in the United States[,]’” Judge Koeltl acknowledged that the Court
“did, however, make it clear that that question is guided by the text of the
Exchange Act and by the need to adopt clear tests that avoid interference
with foreign securities regulation.”143
The Exchange Act defines the term “purchase” to include “any
contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.”144 Citing Second Circuit
precedent, the Swiss Re plaintiff argued that an individual becomes a
purchaser within the meaning of the Exchange Act “when he or she
incur[s] an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock,” i.e., at the
moment the investor places a buy order.145 Because the relevant buy orders
were placed by brokers located in Chicago, the plaintiff asserted that its
purchases of Swiss Re common stock occurred in the U.S.146 Judge Koeltl
noted that other courts considering f-squared claims had “unanimously
rejected” this argument and reasoned that the term “purchase” must be
construed so as to avoid the international conflicts of law concerns raised in
Morrison.147 Consequently, the court held that “as a general matter, a
purchase order in the United States for a security that is sold on a foreign
exchange is insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of section
10(b) of the Exchange Act.”148
After finding that the trades were executed, cleared, and settled in
Europe, Judge Koeltl proceeded to reject the plaintiff’s arguments that
these were nevertheless domestic securities transactions within the scope of
Section 10(b). First, the court held that the plaintiff’s status as a U.S.
resident was irrelevant: “A purchaser’s citizenship or residency does not
affect where a transaction occurs; a foreign resident can make a purchase
within the United States, and a United States resident can make a purchase
outside the United States.”149 Second, the fact that the investment decision
was made in Chicago had “no bearing on where the stock was ultimately

142. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F.
Supp. 2d 166, 175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 176 (quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at 177 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (2010)).
145. Id. (citing Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954)).
146. Id.
147. See id. (stating that the term “‘purchase’ cannot bear the expansive construction
plaintiffs propose, at least for the purposes of Morrison’s transactional test”).
148. Id. at 178.
149. Id.
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purchased.”150 Third, although the plaintiff may have suffered financial
harm in the U.S., “the location of the harm . . . is independent of the
location of the securities transaction that produced the harm.” 151 Fourth, it
was deemed immaterial that the purchase orders were placed and executed
in Chicago.152 The plaintiff’s claims were therefore dismissed for failing to
satisfy the transactional test.153
IV. A TEXT-BASED RATIONALE FOR DISMISSING F-SQUARED CLAIMS
Although courts considering f-squared claims post-Morrison arguably
have reached the correct result, the means by which they have arrived at
their holdings has, to date, been unnecessarily protracted and circuitous.
Rather than relying on the Supreme Court’s policy objectives in
announcing its new test or attempting to divine the Court’s intentions from
Justice Stevens’ concurrence, courts confronted with f-squared claims
should look first to the text of the transactional test itself. As noted
previously, the Morrison Court provided three articulations of the test:
1. “And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”154
2. “[W]hether the purchase or sale is made in the United States,
or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange . . . .”155
3. “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”156
Although worded slightly differently, each articulation of the test was
meant to track the language of Section 10(b), which prohibits deceptive
conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.”157
Whereas the Second Circuit had been unable to identify a textual or even
extra-textual basis for the conduct and effects tests, the Morrison Court was
careful to note the transactional test’s textual origin:158
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 177.
153. Id.
154. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
155. Id. at 2886.
156. Id. at 2888.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010).
158. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Hath Morrison Wrought?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 2010,
at 5 (“Morrison is a decision that rests at least as much on a close reading of the statutory
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Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only
deceptive conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered.” Those purchase-and-sale transactions
are the objects of the statute’s solicitude. It is those transactions
that the statute seeks to “regulate[;]” it is parties or prospective
parties to those transactions that the statute seeks to “protect.”
And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.159
In announcing the transactional test, Justice Scalia sought to justify his use
of the term “listed” rather than “registered” by noting that the Exchange
Act’s “registration requirements apply only to securities listed on national
securities exchanges.”160
The transactional test’s basis in the text of Section 10(b) has
significant implications for plaintiffs seeking to assert f-squared claims.
Specifically, if the “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges”
prong of the test corresponds to the “purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange” provision of Section 10(b),
then the “domestic transactions in other securities” prong of the test
necessarily corresponds to the “any security not so registered” provision of
the statute. Consequently, Congress’s motivation for including the phrase
“any security not so registered” in the text of Section 10(b) is directly
relevant to how lower courts interpret the “domestic transactions in other
securities” prong of the transactional test.
The Exchange Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress included
the phrase “any security not so registered” to provide for the regulation of
the domestic over-the-counter markets, not foreign securities exchanges.161
As originally drafted, the Act regulated only purchases and sales of
registered securities.162 The phrase “any security not so registered” was
subsequently added to prevent a large-scale exodus from the national

text as on the presumption against extraterritoriality.”); see also George T. Conway, III,
Postscript to Morrison v. National Australia Bank, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 14, 2010, at 5
(acknowledging that the transactional test’s “reference to ‘the purchase or sale of a security
listed on an American stock exchange’—derives from § 10(b)’s reference to ‘the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange’”).
159. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 2885.
161. See generally Randall W. Quinn, The Supreme Court’s Use of Legislative History in
Interpreting the Federal Securities Laws, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 262, 276 (1994) (asserting that
“[a]s to the securities laws specifically, legislative history provides an invaluable context for
judicial interpretation”).
162. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 426–28, 443–44 (1990).
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securities exchanges.163 Congress feared that if the Act’s scope was limited
to registered securities, companies would de-list from the national
exchanges in favor of selling their securities in the over-the-counter
markets.164 The inclusion of the phrase “any security not so registered” was
designed to remove this incentive by bringing the over-the-counter markets
within the purview of the Exchange Act.165
The statutory text confirms that regulation of the domestic over-thecounter markets was a key objective of the Seventy-Third Congress. The
Exchange Act’s prologue acknowledges that “transactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions.”166
According to the Act, the need for regulation stemmed from the fact that
(1) “[transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets] . . . in large part originate outside
the States in which the exchanges and over-the-counter markets are
located[;]” (2) “[t]he prices established and offered in such transactions are
generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and
foreign countries[;]” and (3) “[f]requently the prices of securities on such
exchanges and [over-the-counter] markets are susceptible to manipulation
and control.”167
The United States Supreme Court has likewise recognized that “[t]he
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation
of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges
and in over-the-counter markets.”168
Thus, for the purposes of the transactional test, the most logical
reading of the phrase “domestic transactions in other securities” is
“transactions in the domestic over-the-counter market.”169 This distinction
163. Id. at 443, 444 n.263.
164. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 before
the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 6495-96, 6539-41, 6547-49, 6554-55,
6699 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings], reprinted in 6 and 7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 22 (J.S. Ellenberger
& Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at
15–16 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 18; S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5–6
(1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 17.
165. Hearings, supra note 164, Item 22; H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, supra note 164, Item 18,
at 22–23.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010). According to Justice Scalia, “[n]othing suggests that this
national public interest pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and
markets.” Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (emphasis in original).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010).
168. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
169. See Vivendi, S.A.’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law Regarding the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. at 5 n.2, In re Vivendi
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is significant to the extent it excludes transactions conducted on exchange
markets from the “domestic transactions in other securities” prong of the
transactional test. Whereas exchange markets are “auction markets where
the orders of buyers and sellers are concentrated for the purpose of offering
transactions through the meeting of the highest bid and the lowest offer,”170
“the over-the-counter market is a negotiated market in which . . . dealers
acting as principals buy from and sell to investors or other dealers at an
undisclosed profit.”171 Consequently, U.S. investors’ purchase of securities
on foreign exchanges would not qualify as “transactions in the domestic
over-the-counter market” under the proposed reading of the transactional
test.
This text-based rationale arguably provides the simplest, most direct
means for disposing of f-squared claims post-Morrison. Had the Supreme
Court simply affirmed the dismissal of the Australian Plaintiffs’ claims
without bothering to articulate a new test for determining the scope of
Section 10(b), lower courts would be justified in relying on the rationale
underlying the Morrison Court’s holding. In announcing the transactional
test, however, the Supreme Court sought to limit lower courts’ analyses to
whether the relevant transactions involved a security listed on a domestic
stock exchange or traded in the domestic over-the-counter market. To date,
the construction advocated in this Article represents the only text-based
rationale for dismissing f-squared claims under the transactional test.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEWLY-CLARIFIED TRANSACTIONAL TEST

As demonstrated in Section IV, supra, securities transactions in the
domestic over-the-counter market remain subject to the antifraud
Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The phrase ‘purchase or
sale of any other security in the United States’ . . . plainly refers only to purchases of
unregistered securities . . . .”); The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC’s Supplemental
Memorandum of Law Addressing the Impact of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
on its Pending Motions to Dismiss at 10 n.7, In re Royal Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec.
Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The [Morrison] Court’s statement that the
Exchange Act applies to ‘domestic transactions in other securities’ besides those listed in
the United States appears to refer to domestic transactions in unlisted securities (e.g., overthe-counter securities that do not qualify for listing on a domestic exchange), as opposed to
securities listed on foreign exchanges.”); see also Lancer Mgmt. Group LLC v. Lauer, No.
05-60584, 2011 WL 573954, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2011) (finding Morrison
distinguishable where the relevant entities “traded substantial securities on U.S. exchanges
[and] over-the-counter markets”); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2010 WL 3377409, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that “‘domestic transactions’ or ‘purchases or sales in the
United States’ means purchases and sales of securities explicitly solicited by the issuer
within the United States rather than transactions in foreign-traded securities”).
170. Brief for Petitioners at 15 n.7, Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (No.
150).
171. Id. at 15.
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provisions of Section 10(b) under the Supreme Court’s new transactional
test. Post-Morrison, however, some lower courts have shown a willingness
to dismiss securities fraud claims predicated on OTC transactions.172 Not
surprisingly, the merits of these holdings appear dubious when analyzed in
light of the newly-clarified transactional test.
Consider, for example, the securities fraud class action lawsuit
brought against Société Générale (“SocGen”)173 following the collapse of
the subprime mortgage market.174 There, two of the three named plaintiffs
(“Ordinary Share Plaintiffs”)175 were U.S. investors who purchased
SocGen’s ordinary shares on the Euronext Paris stock exchange.176 The
third named plaintiff (“ADR Plaintiff”)177 was a U.S. investor who
purchased SocGen ADRs in the domestic over-the-counter market.178
While conceding that the ADR Plaintiff’s claims remained viable postMorrison, the defendants moved to dismiss the Ordinary Share Plaintiffs’
claims on the ground they ran afoul of the transactional test.179 To the
parties’ surprise, the judge dismissed all three of the named plaintiffs’
claims based solely on Morrison.180
Significantly, in evaluating the ADR Plaintiff’s claims, the judge
ignored the transactional test altogether. Instead, dismissal was predicated
on the court’s characterization of ADR trades as “predominantly foreign
securities transaction[s].”181 For support, the court cited to a single, preMorrison opinion applying the now defunct conduct and effects tests.182
172. Such holdings were foreseeable given the Supreme Court’s failure, in announcing
the transactional test, to reference the over-the-counter market explicitly or otherwise
specify the circumstances under which a transaction will be deemed to have occurred in the
domestic over-the-counter market.
173. In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL 3910286, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
174. Id.
175. The Ordinary Share Plaintiffs were Vermont Pension Investment Committee and
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Fund. Id.
176. Id.
177. The ADR Plaintiff was United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 880
Retail Food Employers Joint Pension Fund. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *5–*6.
180. Id. at *5–*7.
181. Id. at *6.
182. Id. (citing Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). Copeland, in
turn, cites to In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation for the proposition that
“[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a predominately foreign securities transaction.”
Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506 (citing In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537
F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). However, the court in SCOR Holding did not rule that
ADR trades are predominately foreign securities transactions but instead simply assumed so
for the sake of applying the effects test. SCOR Holding, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 561. Moreover,
in SCOR Holding the court ultimately determined that it possessed subject matter
jurisdiction “over the claims of any person who purchased . . . ADSs on the NYSE.” Id. at
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Moreover, the judge incorrectly asserted that dismissal of the ADR
Plaintiff’s claims was supported by Credit Suisse.183 In Credit Suisse,
however, Judge Marrero’s dismissal order was limited to claims brought by
investors who purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock
Exchange, and the claims of investors who purchased ADRs on the New
York Stock Exchange were allowed to proceed.184
The authority relied upon by the judge, thus, did not support dismissal
of the ADR Plaintiff’s claims. Although the ruling is arguably ripe for
reversal as a result, had the court undertaken a text-based analysis of the
transactional test, the error of its reasoning would have been plain.
Application of the transactional test would have revealed that the ADR
Plaintiff’s claims necessarily survive post-Morrison for the simple reason
that they are predicated on securities transactions in the domestic over-thecounter market.
Another opinion that is questionable in light of the newly-clarified
transactional test is Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm.185
In that case, a group of Cayman Island based hedge funds (“Funds”)186
claimed to be the victims of a pump-and-dump scheme orchestrated by
certain defendants, including the Funds’ Europe-based investment
manager.187 According to the amended complaint, the scheme worked as
follows: After obtaining control of a dormant or near dormant shell
company, the defendants would cause one or more of the Funds to purchase
a subscription for the company’s shares.188 The defendants, meanwhile,
would already own large quantities of the company’s shares or have the
company issue shares and warrants to them in exchange for arranging the
Funds’ purchases.189 Thereafter, the defendants would cause the Funds to
trade and re-trade “the stocks many times over, sometimes on the same
day, between and among [themselves]” in order to inflate the stocks’ price
560 n.3.
183. Société Générale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6 n.5.
184. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The SocGen court rejected the Ordinary Share Plaintiffs’ argument that because they were
U.S. investors who placed their buy orders through U.S.-based investment managers, their
purchases constituted domestic transactions within the meaning of the transactional test.
Société Générale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *5–*6. However, like the cases discussed in
Section III(B), supra, the SocGen judge did not base his decision on the text of the
transactional test but instead relied on Judge Marrero’s holding in Credit Suisse and the
Morrison Court’s damning indictment of the conduct and effects tests to conclude that
dismissal of the Ordinary Share Plaintiffs’ claims was warranted. See id.
185. No. 09 CV 8862, 2010 WL 5415885, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Amended Complaint at 11–12, Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm,
2010 WL 5415885 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010) (No. 09 CV 8862).
189. Id. at 12.
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“to the point at which [the] [d]efendants were free to sell previously
untradeable shares and exercise certain warrants, which [the] [d]efendants
then sold to the Funds at a profit.”190 These intra-Funds trades also served
to generate commissions for certain of the defendants acting in a brokerdealer capacity.191 The amended complaint asserted claims under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as well as common law claims for fraud and breach
of fiduciary duty.192
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the amended complaint based on Morrison.193 In relevant
part, the order provided:
Defendants, with the exception of [Todd] Ficeto and Hunter
[World Markets, Inc.], are foreign nationals. The corporations
that issued the Penny Stocks were registered with the SEC,
however, their shares were not traded on a domestic exchange.
Instead, the fraudulent scheme alleged involved private offerings
[registered with the SEC] . . . in which the Funds were caused to
purchase the illiquid shares directly from the companies through
private placements. At no point were the shares released to the
general market. In fact, the entire “market” alleged was the
trading by and between the Funds.194
Consequently, the court found that dismissal was warranted because the
Funds’ trades did not satisfy the transactional test.195
In reaching its holding, however, the court appears to have been
preoccupied with the manner in which the Funds initially acquired the
securities such that it failed to consider the impact of the subsequent intraFunds trades used to inflate the securities’ prices.196 Moreover, the court’s
application of the transactional test was limited to evaluating whether the
trades constituted “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges”
under the first prong of the test without considering whether the trades
qualified as “domestic transactions in other securities” under the second
prong of the test.197 As noted previously, two of the defendants, Todd
190. Absolute Activist, 2010 WL 5415885, at *3.
191. Id.
192. Amended Complaint, supra note 188, at 56–60.
193. Because oral argument on the defendants’ motion to dismiss was held one day
before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison, the parties were not given an
opportunity, either orally or in writing, to address the transactional test’s impact on the
Funds’ claims. Absolute Activist, 2010 WL 5415885, at *4.
194. Id. at *5. The various penny stock companies’ shares, however, were either quoted
on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board or by Pink OTC Markets Inc. Amended Complaint,
supra note 188, at 2.
195. Absolute Activist, 2010 WL 5415885, at *5–*6.
196. The court’s analysis similarly fails to account for the eventual sale of the
defendants’ personal holdings to the Funds.
197. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
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Ficeto and Hunter World Markets, Inc., were California residents.
Significantly, Hunter was the registered broker-dealer responsible for
executing the intra-Funds trades alleged in the amended complaint.198
Ficeto, meanwhile, was Hunter’s president and a registered securities agent
in several U.S. states.199 Thus, although the buy and sell orders for the
intra-Funds trades may have originated in Europe, the actual trades
arguably took place in the domestic over-the-counter market such that they
satisfy Morrison under the newly-clarified transactional test.200 At the very
least, the parties should have been given an opportunity to brief the impact
of Morrison so that a better-developed factual record would exist regarding
the precise nature of the intra-Funds trades.201
CONCLUSION
In announcing the transactional test, the Morrison Court sought to
create a new, bright-line rule that would avoid the unpredictability and
inconsistency of the conduct and effects tests. In application, the
transactional test has thrust a reasonably well-settled area of the law into
abject confusion. This outcome was inevitable in light of the Court’s
inability to commit to a single articulation of the test and its concomitant
failure to define the test’s precise scope and contours. Nonetheless, this
Article argues that by examining the statutory text from which the
transactional test was derived, a bright-line rule may still be salvaged from
Morrison.

198. Amended Complaint, supra note 188, at 6, 8, 11–13, 15–16, 22–23, 26, 31, 34, 38,
41, 51.
199. Id. at 5, 8.
200. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d
166, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL
3910286, at *5–*6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Funds subsequently raised this argument on
appeal. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6–10, Absolute Activist Value Master Fund
Ltd. v. Ficeto, No. 11-221 (2d Cir. July 21, 2011).
201. See Anwar v. Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding
“that a more developed factual record is necessary to inform a proper determination as to
whether [the] [p]laintiffs’ purchases . . . occurred in the United States”); see also Painter et
al., supra note 116, at 7 (noting that although “the vast majority of over-the-counter
transactions . . . occur in one country or another . . . situations occur where the location of
the transaction is ambiguous”).

